Abstract-We study the problem of achieving strong secrecy over wiretap channels at negligible cost, in the sense of maintaining the overall communication rate of the same channel without secrecy constraints. Specifically, we propose and analyze two source-channel coding architectures, in which secrecy is achieved by multiplexing public and confidential messages. In both cases, our main contribution is to show that secrecy can be achieved without compromising communication rate and by requiring only randomness of asymptotically vanishing rate. Our first sourcechannel coding architecture relies on a modified wiretap channel code, in which randomization is performed using the output of a source code. In contrast, our second architecture relies on a standard wiretap code combined with a modified source code termed uniform compression code, in which a small shared secret seed is used to enhance the uniformity of the source code output. We carry out a detailed analysis of uniform compression codes and characterize the optimal size of the shared seed.
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I. INTRODUCTION

W
HILE cryptography is traditionally implemented at the application layer, physical-layer security aims at ensuring secrecy by taking advantage of the inherent noise at the physical-layer of communication channels. The benefits of physical-layer security are substantiated by numerous theoretical results [4] , [5] , in particular those related to the wiretap channel model [6] , which suggest that one can achieve information-theoretic secrecy without sharing secret keys. Although early works on physical-layer security were mostly restricted to eavesdropping attacks under optimistic Fig. 1 . Multiplexing of confidential and public sources. The confidential source, V n c , must be reconstructible by the receiver and must be kept secret from the eavesdropper. The public source, V n p , should be reconstructible by the receiver, and information may be leaked to the eavesdropper.
assumptions regarding channel knowledge, and only established the existence of codes for physical-layer security by means of non-constructive random coding arguments, there has been much progress recently. In particular, attacker models have been extended to situations with limited channel knowledge, e.g., with compound channels [7] - [11] , state-dependent channels [12] , [13] , or arbitrarily varying channels [14] - [16] ; several explicit low-complexity codes with strong informationtheoretic secrecy guarantees have also been designed, for instance, based on low-density parity check codes [17] , polar codes [18] - [20] or invertible extractors [21] , [22] .
Despite these recent advances, physical-layer security schemes are yet to be integrated into communication systems. One factor that may have hindered their adoption is the limited attention paid to the cost of physical-layer security, assessed in terms of the decrease in achievable communication rates, and the additional resources required for its implementation. In fact, if one hopes to deploy physical-layer systems, it is reasonable to ask that their operation: i) be transparent or at least compatible with upper layer protocols, ii) not affect communication rates, and iii) not require additional resources. However, most studies of physical-layer security focus on the characterization of secrecy capacity, which is always less than the capacity, thereby suggesting that secrecy can only be achieved at the cost of reducing communication rates; furthermore, most existing models and coding schemes implicitly assume the presence of an unlimited source of uniform random numbers to realize a stochastic encoder.
The objective of this paper is to revisit these assumptions and to show that the cost of secrecy can be made negligible, i.e., secrecy neither incurs a reduction in overall communication rate nor requires extra randomness resources. The crux of our approach is to analyze the wiretap channel model illustrated in Fig. 1 , in which the encoder only uses a random seed of vanishing rate. More specifically, the 0018-9448 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. objective is to multiplex a confidential source with a public source, while maximizing the sum-rate of secret and public communication. The idea of multiplexing messages to achieve secrecy already implicitly appears in the original work of Csiszár and Körner [23] , and is explicitly formalized in [24] - [26] ; however, our approach differs in that: (i) we relax the common assumption that messages are exactly uniformly distributed, which is unrealistic even if messages are compressed with optimal source codes [27] , [28] ; and (ii) we consider a strong notion of secrecy.
The main contributions of this paper are two source-channel coding architectures that achieve information-theoretic secrecy over this channel model. The first one, illustrated in Fig. 2(a) , is based on wiretap codes and requires a random seed of negligible rate to compress the public source. The second one, illustrated in Fig. 2(b) , combines a wiretap code designed to operate with uniform randomization with a modified source encoder, which compresses data while simultaneously ensuring near-uniform outputs. This second architecture is slightly more restrictive than the first simply because it requires the encoder and the decoder to share in advance a small secret seed. For both architectures the presence of a random seed at the encoder is meant to obtain a nearly uniform source from the public source, and is thus unnecessary if the public source is uniform. Nevertheless, regardless of the architecture, a secret key for authentication is required [29] , [30] . While both architectures achieve the same optimal performance, the former modifies the physical layer of the protocol stack whereas the latter modifies the application layer, which makes it much easier to implement protocol changes. We also highlight that the concept of uniform compression introduced and studied in Section IV is of independent interest, as it can be used in other security problems. For instance, in secure network coding [31] - [34] , security is typically obtained by injecting uniformly distributed "packets" into the network, which the destination nodes are able to decode along with the messages. Similar to the compression of the public source with uniform compression codes in Section IV, these uniformly distributed "packets" in secure network coding could be replaced by uniformly compressed public messages.
Our model initially presented in [1] is closely related to the concurrent study [35] and the subsequent study [36] , with journal versions [37] , [38] . However, our model is not subsumed by any of the models considered in [35] and [37] or in [36] and [38] . The main difference with [36] and [38] is that we only allow a vanishing rate of randomness to be used at the encoder to account for all the resources required to achieve strong secrecy. This assumption results in an additional constraint on the rate of the public source, which is not accounted for by the analysis of [36] and [38] . We provide additional details on how our achievability schemes differ from [36] , [38] in Remark 1. Our model also differs from [35] and [37] , as we consider non-uniform sources instead of uniform messages, so the analysis in [35] , [37] does not apply. We further detail in Remark 2 how our achievability schemes differ from those in [35] , [37] . Because of differences in the models considered, the two achievability arguments we present are conceptually different from those in [35] and [37] , and shed a different light on how to implement multiplexing.
Remark 1: In [36] and [38] , the authors analyze the transmission over a wiretap channel of a common message S 0 and multiple confidential messages S 1 , . . . , S T that may not be jointly independent. Moreover, the encoder is allowed to encode these T + 1 messages using a randomized encoder. In our approach, we have two independent sources, which when compressed losslessly but separately, yield two separate non-uniform messages. One of these sources is confidential, while the other is public and can possibly be leaked to the eavesdropper. However, in the two architectures considered in our work, the encoding is only allowed to use a random seed whose length grows sub-linearly in the code length n. This introduces a new constraint on the minimum rate of the public source that is absent in [36] and [38] . Furthermore, the randomized encoding in [36] and [38] [35] and [37] . Despite similarities with the converse for our model, the converse in [35] and [37] does not directly apply to the setting considered in Section IV because of the presence of a shared seed. Therefore, for completeness a converse for our model is provided in Appendix A.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formally describe the communication model under consideration. In Sections III and IV, we prove that the two architectures shown in Fig. 2 achieve near-optimal performance, i.e., offer the same rate trade-offs as the communication problem without security constraints. More specifically, we show in Section III the existence of wiretap codes that ensure secrecy with non-uniform randomization, while in Section IV, we show how to render the output of a source code nearly uniform. Section V concludes the paper with some perspectives for future work.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Notation
Random variables, e.g., X, and their realizations, e.g., x, are denoted by uppercase and lowercase serif font, respectively, while alphabets, e.g., X , are denoted by calligraphic font. Unless otherwise specified, random variables have finite alphabets, and the generic probability mass function of X is denoted by p X . Basic information-theoretic quantities, e.g., H (X), I (X; Y ) are defined as in [39] . For two random variables X and X over the alphabet X , the variational distance between
B. Wiretap Channel Model
Let X , Y and Z be finite alphabets. As illustrated in Fig. 1 • A deterministic encoding function f n : V n c × V n p × 1, 2 d n → X n , which maps n symbols of the confidential source and n symbols of the public source to a codeword of length n with the help of a uniformly distributed seed of length d n bits;
which maps a sequence of n channel output observations to n symbols of the confidential source and n symbols of the public source. The performance of C n is measured in terms of the average probability of error
and in terms of the secrecy metric
Note that since we do not know the exact output distribution of the source encoders, we impose a security constraint akin to semantic security [22] . We also require the length of the uniformly distributed seed to be sub-linear in n, i.e.,
Note that in our second architecture presented in Section IV and depicted in Figure 2(b) , we allow the seed to be shared between the encoder and the decoder, in which case, the seed is also an argument to the decoding function g n .
C. Source-Channel Coding Theorem
then there exists a sequence of codes {C n } n 1 such that
Conversely, if there exists a sequence of codes {C n } n 1 such that (1) holds, then there must exist a random variable Q over Q with |Q| 3 such that Q − X − Y Z and
Although the result might seem intuitive, the achievability proof does not follow from standard arguments and known results because of the use of vanishing-rate randomness at the encoder. The main contributions of this paper are the two achievability proofs detailed next, the first one in Section III using the architecture of Fig. 2(a) , the second one in Section IV using the architecture of Fig. 2(b) . Note that the converse in [37] does not directly apply to the setting of Section IV, because of the presence of a pre-shared seed. We provide a detailed proof for the converse of Theorem 1 in Appendix A. [1] , [37] . Similar to [40, Appendix C] , it is sufficient to consider an alphabet Q such that |Q| 3 by Fenchel-EgglestonCarathéodory theorem. If one were to rely on known wiretap codes [6] , [23] to transmit the confidential and public sources, and meet the strong secrecy constraint for the confidential source, one would have to ensure that the randomization of the encoder could be performed with a nearly uniform source of random numbers, measured at least in terms of total variation. If no reconstruction constraints were placed on the public source (V p , p V p ), a natural approach would simply be to extract the intrinsic randomness of the source [41] to generate nearly uniform random numbers; this strategy happens to be optimal as shown in [1, Proposition 1]. However, unlike the model in [1] , the present setting requires the reconstruction of the public source at the receiver. Although lossless compression of the public source might intuitively seem to solve the problem, it would actually not lead to a uniform random number. As alluded to earlier, [27] shows that lossless compression of a source at the optimal rate does not necessarily ensure uniformity under variational distance. In addition, for DMSs, [28, Th. 4] shows that there exists a fundamental trade-off between reconstruction error probability and uniformity of the encoder output measured in variational distance. To circumvent this limitation, we design wiretap codes that operate with a non-uniform randomization.
A. Wiretap Codes With Non-Uniform Randomization
We start by studying the wiretap channel model illustrated in Fig. 3 , in which the objective is to encode a secret message M c ∈ 1, 2 n R c by means of a public message M p ∈ 1, 2 n R p ; we do not assume that messages are uniform, but we assume that the statistics of the public message M p are known to the encoder. We call the corresponding wiretap code a (2 n R c , 2 n R p , n) wiretap code. In this case, we show that secrecy is still achievable, but at a rate
where H 2 (M p ) denotes the Rényi entropy of order 2 and is given by
Proposition 1: Let p Q XY Z be a joint distribution that factorizes as p
there exists a sequence of wiretap codes {C n } n 1 such that
As shown in [1, Proposition 1], if one did not require the reconstruction of M p , one could achieve secret rates R c as in Proposition 1, but with the constraint
, and the penalty paid by using the Rényi entropy instead of the Shannon entropy may be significant. The following example highlights an extreme example of such a situation.
Example 1: Consider M p ∈ 1, 2 n R p such that
where
[ is a parameter that controls the uniformity of the distribution. Note that
Consequently, the achievable rates predicted in Proposition 1 could be arbitrarily smaller than those in [1, Proposition 1]. Fortunately, a combination of a source code with a wiretap code identified in Proposition 1 is sufficient to achieve the optimal rate of Theorem 1.
B. Achievability of Theorem 1 Based on Wiretap Codes With Non-Uniform Randomization
We first refine a known result regarding the existence of good source codes.
Lemma 1: Consider a DMS (V, p V ).
Then, there exists a sequence of source encoders f n : V n × 1, 2 d n → 1, 2 n R n and associated decoders g n such that
We consider a typical-sequence-based source code. Specifically, let n ∈ N, let 0 > 0 function of n to be determined later, and let T n 0 (V ) be the set of 0 -letter-typical sequences of length n with respect to p V [39] . The typical sequences are labeled v n (m) with m ∈ 1, 2 n R n and R n
otherwise it generates m ∈ 1, 2 n R n uniformly a random. Note that this uniform selection when the realization of V n is atypical can be done by a random seed U d n of appropriate size d n . Decoding is performed by returning the typical sequence v n (m) corresponding to the received message m. By [39, Th. 1.1], we know that
where supp denotes the support of a distribution, and
and m is drawn uniformly from 1, 2
We may choose 0 = n −1/2+ b and b > 0. Note that the encoder requires U d n to encode the nontypical sequences. To mitigate this requirement, we apply the encoder to b(n) sequences of length a(n), where a(n) and b(n) are any integers such that a(n)b(n) = n and lim n→∞ a(n) = +∞ = lim n→∞ b(n). 1 Hence, the amount of required randomness is negligible compared to n since
. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to the source codes identified in Lemma 1 as "typical-sequence based" source codes.
Going back to the setting of Section II-B, let us apply Lemma 1 to both sources (V c , p V c ) and
Note that we only need randomness for the public source. If there exists a distribution p Q XY Z that satisfies the condition of Proposition 1, then, there exists N 2 ∈ N and a wiretap code with encoder-decoder pair ( f n , g n ) such that for n > N 2 ,
Encoding the sources into codewords as
, and forming estimates from the channel output is in fact the concatenation of the encoded public and confidential sources, we observe that for n > max(
. By taking the limit → 0, we conclude with Lemma 1 that a code for the wiretap channel can be constructed provided
IV. CODING ARCHITECTURE BASED ON UNIFORM COMPRESSION CODES
In this section, we develop a second optimal architecture. As before, our objective is to circumvent the impossibility of generating uniform random numbers with source codes [28, Th. 4] , but this time by modifying the operation of the source codes themselves. The approach to overcome this impossibility is to introduce a small shared uniformly distributed random seed. The benefit of this second architecture is that it only requires a modification at the application layer of the protocol stack. However, the price paid is that the transmitter and the receiver must now share a seed whose rate can be shown to be made vanishingly small. This contrasts with our first architecture in Section III for which the seed is not available at the decoder.
A. Uniform Compression Codes
Consider a DMS (X , p X ). Let n ∈ N, d n ∈ N, and let U d n be a uniform random variable over U d n 1, 2 d n independent of X n . In the following we refer to U d n as the seed and d n as its length. As illustrated in Figure 4 , our objective is to design a source code to compress and reconstruct the DMS (X , p X ) with the assistance of a seed
The performance of the code is measured in terms of the average probability of error and the uniformity of its output as
where U M n has uniform distribution over M n . 
Remark 4: Uniformity could be measured with the stronger metric
Our main result in this section is the characterization of the infimum of achievable rates with uniform compression codes as well as the optimal scaling of the seed length d n .
In the following, we use the Landau notation to characterize the limiting behavior of the seed scaling.
Proposition 2: Let (X , p X ) be a DMS. The infimum of achievable rates with uniform compression codes is H (X). This infimum is achievable with a seed length d n
Proof: See Appendix C.
B. Explicit Uniform Compression Codes
As a first attempt to develop a practical scheme for uniform compression codes, we propose an achievability scheme for Proposition 2 based on invertible extractors [43] . We start by recalling known facts about extractors.
Definition 4 [43] : 
The following proposition shows that one can establish optimal uniform compression codes using such invertible extractors. Proposition 3: Let (X , p X ) be a binary memoryless source. For any R > H (X) and for any > 0, the rate R can be achieved with a sequence of uniform compression codes such that
• the seed length scales as d n = (n 1/2+ );
• the encoder φ n : X n × U d n → M n is composed of a typical-sequence based source code combined with an invertible extractor as described in Figure 5 .
Proof: See Appendix D. Unfortunately, this scheme is not fully practical because it relies on a typical-sequence based compression. To provide at least one explicit and low-complexity example, we finally develop a uniform compression code based on polar codes be the source polarization transform defined in [45] , and set
In the following, we denote the complement set operation by the superscript c. We also define the sets
A polar-based uniform compression code is obtained by defining the encoding function φ N as follows. Let U |H X \V X | denote a sequence of uniformly distributed random bits with length (N log N) , where N denotes the code length.
Proof: See Appendix E.
C. Achievability of Theorem 1 Based on Uniform Compression Codes
The uniform compression codes of Section IV-A may now be combined with known wiretap codes (as depicted in Figure 2(b) ), whose properties we recall in the following lemma.
Lemma 
then there exists a sequence of wiretap codes {C n } n 1 such that
Let > 0. Going back again to the setting of Section II-B, we encode the confidential DMS using a traditional source code as in Lemma 1, and the public DMS using a uniform compression code as in Proposition 2. The corresponding source encoder-decoder pairs are denoted ( f c n , g c n ) and ( f p n , g p n ), respectively, and we set M c f c
We assume n large enough so that
Under the conditions (3)- (5) of Lemma 2, which are met whenever
for n sufficiently large there exists a wiretap code C n with encoder/decoder pair ( f n , g n ) so that for any m c , and for M p distributed according to p U n Rp , the uniform distribution over 1, 2 n R p ,
where (M p ,M c ) is the estimate of (M p , M c ) by the decoder of C n , and for any z n , m c , m p ,
Note that (8)- (10) holds by Lemma 2 because we have assumedM p uniformly distributed. We now study the consequences of using the wiretap code C n with M p (not exactly uniformly distributed) instead ofM p . Specifically, we note (M p ,M c ) the resulting estimate of (M p , M c ) by the decoder of C n , and define for any z n , m c , m p ,
We then have for any m c ,
where (a), (c), and (e) follow by the triangle inequality, (b) holds by (10), (d) and ( f ) hold by (7) . Consider then an optimal coupling [46] between
We have for any m c ,
where the last inequality follows from (7) and (8) . Similarly, using (7) and (9), we have for any m c ,
Encoding the sources into codewords with C n as
, and forming estimates from the channel output
For any v n c ∈ V n c , we also have
where (a) follows by the triangle inequality, (b) holds because Z n → M c → V n c . Since > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily small, we obtain again the achievability part of Theorem 1.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed and analyzed two coding architectures for multiplexing confidential and public messages that achieve information-theoretic secrecy over the wiretap channel. Our first architecture relies on wiretap codes that do not require uniform randomization, while the second architecture exploits compression codes that output nearly uniform messages. By showing that secrecy can be achieved with only vanishingrate randomness resources, and without reducing the overall rate of reliable communication, the proposed architectures establish that secrecy can be achieved at negligible cost.
An important issue that we have not addressed is the design of universal wiretap codes that merely require that the public message carries enough randomness, and do not require the knowledge of the statistics. Some results in this direction are already available in [38] . Finally, the design of actual codes for the proposed architecture remains an important avenue for future research.
APPENDIX A CONVERSE OF THEOREM 1
We consider the problem described in Section II-B when the uniformly distributed seed is shared between the encoder and the decoder, as is the case in Section IV. Obviously, the converse will also hold when the seed is not available at the decoder, as is the case in Section III. We develop our converse following techniques similar to Csiszár and Körner [23] and Oohama and Watanabe [37] . Although the ideas are similar, the converse does not follow directly from these known results because of the presence of a seed with length d n . Formally, consider two sources (V c , p V c ) and (V p , p V p ) that can be transmitted reliably and secretly. Then, there exists a code with block length n such that
d n /n μ n (sub-linear seed rate), (14) where lim n→∞ n = lim n→∞ δ n = lim n→∞ μ n = 0. We also define n = n + 1/n. Consequently,
where (a) holds by the independence of the sources, (b) holds by (12) and Fano's inequality, (c) holds by (13) . Next,
where (a) and (b) hold by independence of the sources and the seed, (c) holds because X n is a function of V n p , U d n , V n c , (d) holds by (13) , (e) holds because V n c − X n − Z n forms a Markov chain. Similarly,
where (a) holds by independence of the sources and the seed, (b) holds by (12) and Fano's inequality. Finally,
where (a) holds by (14) , (b) holds by uniformity of the seed, (c) holds because X n is a function of V n p , U d n , V n c . The single letterization is obtained by introducing a random variable I uniformly distributed over 1, n and defining
Note that the joint distribution of Q, V, X, Y, Z factorizes as
Then, using Csiszár's sum-equality
In addition,
where the inequality holds because
Finally,
where the second equality holds because X i is a function of
Note that using
Hence, we must have
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We fix a joint distribution p Q X on Q × X such that 2 
and n ∈ N. We randomly construct a sequence of codes {C n } n∈N as follows. We generate 2 n R 0 sequences independently at random according to p Q , which we label q n (i ) for i ∈ 1, 2 n R 0 . For each sequence q n (i ), we generate 2 n(R c +R p ) sequences independently a random according to p X |Q , which we label x n (i, j, s) with j ∈ 1, 2 n R c and s ∈ 1, 2 n R p . To transmit a message i ∈ 1, 2 n R 0 and j ∈ 1, 2 n R c , the transmitter obtains a realization s of the public message M p ∈ 1, 2 n R p , and transmits x n (i, j, s) over the channel. Upon receiving y n , Bob decodes i as the received index if it is the unique one such that (q n (i ), y n ) ∈ T n (QY ); otherwise he declares an error. Bob then decodes ( j, s) as the other pair of indices if it is the unique one such that (q n (i ),
Similarly, upon receiving z n , Eve decodes i as the received index if it is the unique one such that (q n (i ), z n ) ∈ T n (Q Z); otherwise she declares an error. For a particular code C n , we note P e (C n ) the probability that Bob does not recover correctly (i, j, s) and that Eve does not recover correctly i .
Proof: The proof follows from a standard random coding argument and is omitted.
Lemma 4: If lim
2 −βn for some β > 0 and all n ∈ N sufficiently large.
Proof: The proof relies on a careful analysis and modification of the "cloud-mixing" lemma [47] . Let > 0. For clarity, we denote herep Q n X n Z n the joint distribution of (Q n , X n , Z n ) induced by the code, as opposed to p Q n X n Z n defined as
First note that the variational distance V(p M c Z n , p M cp Z n ) can be bounded as follows.
Then, let Q n 1 be the sequence in Q n corresponding to M 0 = 1. By symmetry of the random code construction, the average of the variational distance V(p M c Z n , p M cp Z n ) over randomly generated codes C n satisfies
, 2 If such a probability distribution does not exist the result of Lemma 1 is trivial and there is nothing to prove.
The average over the random codes can be split between the average of Q n 1 and the random code C n (q n 1 ) for a fixed value of q n 1 , so that
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the variational distance is always less than 2. The first term on the righthand side vanishes exponentially with n, and we now proceed to bound the expectation in the second term following [47] . First note that, for any z n ∈ Z n ,
We now let 1 denote the indicator function and we define
Taking the expectation of the term in (23) over C n (q n 1 ), we obtain
which vanishes exponentially fast as n goes to infinity for q n 1 ∈ T n (Q). Similarly, taking the expectation of the term in (25) 
which vanishes exponentially fast with n. Finally, we focus on the expectation of the term in (24) over C n (q n 1 ). For z n ∈ T n 2 (Z |q n 1 ), Jensen's inequality and the concavity of
where (a) and (b) follow from the AEP; therefore,
Hence, if lim n→∞
the sum vanishes as n goes to infinity, which concludes the proof.
We point out that a generalized version of Lemma 4 may now be found in [38] ; in fact, [38, Th. 14] develops a general exponential bound on the secrecy metric, and a close inspection of their result shows a tighter exponent involves the Rényi entropy of order 1 + ρ with ρ ∈ [0, 1] in place of the Rényi entropy of order 2. Actually, [48] shows that this is the best exponent with random codes.
Using Markov's inequality, we conclude that there exists at least one code C n satisfying the rate inequalities in Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, such that P e (C n ) 3 · 2 −αn and
2 −αn , and E[S(M c )] 2 −βn , we conclude with Markov's inequality that for n large enough, we have
for at least a quarter of the messages m. Expurgating the code C n to retain only these messages concludes the proof.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
A. Achievability
We show next that there exists a sequence of (2 n R , n, 2 d n ) uniform compression codes {C n } n∈N * such that H (X) is achievable with a seed length d n scaling as
, for any {υ n } n∈N with lim n→∞ υ n = +∞.
2 n R and M n 1, M n . Consider a random mapping : X n × U d n → M n , and its associated decoder :
and (x n , u d n ) = m; otherwise it outputs an error. We let
• We first determine a condition over R to ensure
which allows us to write
where ∀m ∈ M n , ∀i ∈ 1, 2 ,
After some manipulations similar to those used to bound (25), we bound the second term in (26) as
with μ X = min
. Then, we bound the first term in (26) by Jensen's inequality
Moreover, after additional manipulations similar to those used to bound (24), we obtain
Thus, by combining (28) and (29), we obtain
by (27) and (31).
• We now derive a condition over R to ensure
and defining P(x n ,x n , u)
by (32) and (33) . All in all, if R is such that 
We can also choose 1 = υ n √ n , 3 for any υ n with lim n→∞ υ n = +∞, such that
Finally, by means of the selection lemma applied to P e and U e , there exists a realization of such that U e and P e . 3 Note that we cannot make 1 decrease faster because of (27) and (32).
B. Converse
We first show that any achievable rate R must satisfy R H (X). Assume that R is an achievable rate. We note
where ( 
. Let F n denote the cumulative distribution function of Y n . Then, for any x ∈ R, 
Then, there exists an α > 0 such that for any a > b > 0,
Hence,
where (a) holds by the triangle inequality, and (b) holds by Theorem 2. The bound on η ∞,b holds similarly.
We will also make use of the following lemma. Lemma 6: For any φ n :
We apply [49, Lemma 2.1.2] to φ n so that for any n ∈ N, for any a, for any ϒ > 0
Since the encoding function φ n of C n utilizes a seed U d n taking values in 1, 2 d n that is independent of the source X n , we can find u * d n such that
Fix a > b > 0, and define
Note that
where (a) follows from (35) , and (b) holds by Lemma 5 with σ 2 , ρ defined therein. Note that for any
Since L n (a, b) is a subset of source realizations for which the code offers perfect reconstruction (when the seed used is
We now use Lemma 6 with
which yields
From Lemma 5, it follows that
Combining (37) and (38), we obtain ⎛ ⎝ log
Rearranging terms and taking appropriate limit, we get
where in the above arguments, we have used the fact that is invertible, continuous and increasing. 
We however do not need this stronger statement for our purpose.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Let > 0, δ > 0 and n ∈ N. Let t, m, and d n to be expressed later. We know from [43] and [44] that there exists an invertible (m, d, m, t, )-extractor EXT 0 , such that (2) is satisfied. Assume that the emitter and the receiver share a sequence U d n of d n uniformly distributed bits. As described in Figure 5 , we proceed in two steps to encode X n . First, we perform a compression of X n to form S based on 0 -letter typical sequences, 0 > 0, we note this operation φ n : X n → M n , such that S φ n (X n ), and we note ψ n : M n → X n the inverse operation such that
Note that this compression implies lim sup
Then, we apply the extractor EXT 0 to S and U d n , to form the encoded message M = EXT 0 (S, U d n ). We define the encoding function φ n :
and the decoding function ψ n :
which is possible since EXT 0 is invertible. Note that by (39) , (41), we have
and since the sizes of the first input and output of the extractor are the same, by (40), we have lim sup
Moreover, [43] , [44] also shows that U e . It remains to show that for any b > 0, we can choose d n (n 1/2+ b ). Let 0 > 0. As in the proof of Lemma 1, we may show
We define
Thus, since the input size m of the extractor verifies m n(1 + 0 )H (X) , by (2) and (42) Then, we choose 0 = υ n √ n , for any υ n with lim n→∞ υ n = +∞, such that
which means d n = O(υ n √ n).
APPENDIX E PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Let β ∈]0, 1/2[. Let n ∈ N and N 2 n . We set A N X N G N . We define the following sets.
These sets cardinalities satisfy the following properties. 
where the first inequality holds because conditioning reduces entropy and the last inequality follows from the definition of V X . We thus obtain log 2
Finally, by [45] , the receiver can reconstruct X N from A N 
